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Abstract
How does the type of learning material impact what is learned? The current research in-
vestigates the nature of students’ learning of math concepts when using manipulatives 
(Uttal, Scudder, & DeLoache, 1997). We examined how the type of manipulative (concrete, 
abstract, none) and problem-solving prompt (metacognitive or problem-focused) affect 
student learning, engagement, and knowledge transfer. Students who were given concrete 
manipulatives with metacognitive prompts showed better transfer of a procedural skill 
than students given abstract manipulatives or those given concrete manipulatives with 
problem-focused prompts. Overall, students who reported low levels of engagement 
showed better learning and transfer when getting metacognitive prompts, whereas 
students who reported high levels of engagement showed better learning and transfer 
when getting the problem-focused prompts. The results are discussed in regards to their 
implications for education and instruction.
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Learning math can be hard. One way educators try to aid in math learning is by teaching 
new concepts using concrete examples. This has been hypothesized to be an effective 
instructional tactic because it reduces memory load (Sweller, 2006; Sweller, Merrienboer, 
& Paas, 1998), facilitates understanding by grounding new information in meaningful 
prior knowledge (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989), and may increase students’ motiva-
tion to learn and understand the instruction, task, or problem (Cordova & Lepper, 1996; 
Schraw, Flowerday, & Lehman, 2001). However, there are also potential downsides to this 
pedagogical strategy. Using highly realistic situations and materials may cause the knowl-
edge to be tied to the particulars of that scenario, making transfer to other scenarios or 
into abstract terms more difficult (Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003; Son & Goldstone, 2009a). 
The relevant features that are key to deep understanding may be less salient. Moreover, 
the concrete details may distract students from these features (Harp & Mayer, 1998; Son 
& Goldstone, 2009b). It appears that there are open questions as to the best way to use 
concrete materials in learning and whether learning with them is different than learning 
with more abstract materials. 
A second way in which teachers try to aid in math learning is by having students 
engage in valuable and productive activities with the learning materials. This sometimes 
manifests itself as students being “active” with the materials (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989), 
such as giving students manipulatives so that they can get “hands-on” experience (Fuson 
& Briars, 1990). Manipulatives are physical objects that are supposed to help the student 
concretize his or her knowledge by expressing concepts and performing problem-solving 
steps with them. It has been hypothesized that being “active” facilitates learning by doing 
(Anzai & Simon, 1979) and increases attention and engagement (Chi, 2009). However, be-
ing active does not necessarily mean that students are engaging in the kinds of cognitive 
processes that are associated with deep learning (Chi, 2009). Another way teachers may 
try to engage students is by asking them questions that focus on important aspects of 
the learning materials (Graesser & Black, 1985). Metacognitive prompts are questions that 
ask students to reflect on various aspects of the learning materials and problem-solving 
process and have been hypothesized to facilitate abstraction and learning (Schoenfeld, 
1987). We hypothesize that it is not only the content of the learning materials (concrete 
versus abstract) but also how those materials are used that is critical to learning complex 
cognitive skills such as those taught in mathematics and science. 
The development of a complex cognitive skill is more than simply learning a list of 
declarative concepts or a set of rote procedures. Ideally, such learning would result in the 
development of adaptive expertise (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986; Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 
2005), which allows for the flexible application of the knowledge to novel problems. 
Adaptive expertise is hypothesized to be comprised of two sets of skills: one that deals 
with procedural knowledge, and the other with conceptual knowledge. Critically, these 
skills must be integrated and coordinated to facilitate transfer to novel situations. If we 
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take the goal of instruction as the development of adaptive expertise, it makes sense to 
consider how different types of learning environments can influence the acquisition and 
coordination of these skills. 
In the current work we examine how different pairings of learning materials (concrete 
versus abstract) and prompt-based activities (metacognitive versus problem-focused) im-
pact the learning and coordinating of conceptual and procedural skills. We hypothesize that 
concrete materials are most effective when paired with metacognitive prompts because 
they ground new information in prior knowledge but also enable students to abstract the 
critical features through reflection. We are also interested in how student engagement 
with the learning materials interacts with the kinds of prompts they are given. If students 
are highly engaged, are some types of prompts more effective than others? If students are 
already using deep processing strategies, what types of prompts are most effective?
In the next section we briefly review the relevant literature on the effect of different 
learning materials on the development of procedural and conceptual skill. We focus this 
review with the hypothesis that it is not only the type of materials but also how those 
materials are used that determines learning, engagement, and transfer. We then pres-
ent our study, which manipulated whether students learned probability concepts with 
either abstract or concrete materials and with either metacognitive or problem-focused 
prompts.
Prior Work on Abstract and Concrete Learning Materials
Materials can be thought to be abstract1 if they strip away extraneous details and present 
information in a decontextualized way. Frequently, this is accomplished by reducing the 
complexity of the visual stimuli. For example, Goldstone & Sakamoto (2003) used a dy-
namic computer simulation in the context of ants foraging for food to teach the complex 
systems principle of “competitive specialization.” This is the idea that the parts or agents 
of a system can start out undifferentiated and then become specialized through simple 
interactions between those parts. Students could manipulate certain parameters of the 
simulation using sliders (e.g., the number of ants, the walking rate of the closest ant, the 
walking rate of the ants which are not closest) and observe the results. All of the partici-
pants received instructions that the simulation dealt with ants looking for food and their 
goal was to maximize the coverage of resources (food). Half of the participants were given 
depictions of ants and apples, while the other half were given symbols (i.e., dots for the 
ants, blobs for the food). This learning phase was followed by a transfer task, which was 
based on the same principle but in a very different surface domain (e.g., machine learning 
of letter identification). Those participants who had used idealized, symbolic stand-ins for 
the ants and food did better in this new domain than those who had used small images 
of ants and apples (see Figure 1a). The concreteness of seeing ants and apples seemed 
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to have tied any knowledge discovered about the system more tightly to that context, 
while seeing simple blobs and calling them ants made the knowledge more symbolic 
and flexible. 
Similarly, a set of basic, mathematical relations (based on a “modular arithmetic” sys-
tem) was taught to two groups of students (Sloutsky, Kaminski, & Heckler, 2005). One group 
learned these relations for visually salient stimuli, such as polygons with 3-dimensional 
depth, which moved and interacted in movie clips, while the other group used visually 
sparse, static symbols (see Figure 1b). Those who had learned using the more abstract 
materials transferred those rules to a new system of concrete relations and were better 
able to use those rules to solve new problems. In sum, these studies show a benefit for 
learning and transfer when using more abstract materials. 
Abstract objects may help guide attention to focus on important relations between 
objects, rather than the objects themselves (Sloutsky et al., 2005). The result of using more 
abstracted materials seems to be a more flexible understanding of the underlying concep-
tual relations. However, this flexibility may have the downside of requiring a longer period 
of initial learning and poorer ability to apply those concepts in a given scenario. That is, 
Figure 1. Two examples of concrete and idealized (abstract) learning materials. Part 
A reprinted from “The Transfer of Abstract Principles Governing Complex Adaptive 
Systems,” by R.L. Goldstone and Y. Sakamoto, 2003, Cognitive Psychology, 46, p.449, 
Copyright 2003, with permission from Elsevier. Part B reprinted from “The Advantage 
of Simple Symbols for Learning and Transfer” by V.M. Sloutsky, J.A. Kaminski, and A.F. 
Heckler, 2005, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, p. 510, Copyright 2005, with permis-
sion from Psychonomic Society Publications.    
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abstract materials may be helpful in acquiring the conceptual side of adaptive expertise, 
but adaptive expertise also requires some measure of procedural skill as well. Prior work 
has shown that the application of abstract declarative knowledge requires more time and 
cognitive processing than applying procedures acquired by practice on concrete problems 
(Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005). Abstract materials may require so much processing of conceptual 
information that procedural skills are left underdeveloped in the target domain. This sort 
of procedural skill may benefit more from practice with concrete materials. 
Materials can be considered concrete when they include details or use vivid stimuli. 
An example of concrete materials in educational settings is the use of story problems in 
algebra. Algebra is fundamentally a symbolic, abstract system. However, it is frequently 
taught and assessed using concrete word problems. For those just learning algebra, these 
problems are usually easier to solve than symbolic representations of the same problems 
(Koedinger, Alibali, & Nathan, 2008). This improvement stems from students using more 
everyday knowledge and more informal problem-solving strategies when given word 
problems. However, when the problems become more complicated, a more abstract no-
tation is easier, as it may make problem-steps clearer, or may induce a smaller cognitive 
load. 
Concrete materials could also be useful if they highlight salient, important features 
and relations. Children learning fraction concepts show quicker learning when using pie 
pieces rather than tiles, because the pie pieces embody the fraction concept and better 
highlight the nature of the part-whole relationship (Martin & Schwartz, 2005; but see 
Ma, 1999, for a discussion of the limitations of this technique). Finally, concrete materials 
can help develop procedural fluency by increasing the interest in and engagement with 
learning materials (Durik & Haraciewicz, 2007), or by minimizing the amount of cognitive 
load in the problem solving procedure (e.g., Sweller, 2006). 
One movement in schools that is focused on using concrete materials is the push to 
include manipulatives in pedagogy. Manipulatives are considered helpful in math (Ball, 
1992), and reading (e.g., Glenberg, Gutierrez, Levin, Japuntich, & Kaschak, 2004). However, 
there are some important caveats. Developmental research has shown that young chil-
dren have trouble when an object is supposed to both represent itself and stand as a 
symbol for something else (Uttal, Scudder, & DeLoache, 1997). For example, young children 
have trouble locating an object in a full-sized room when given the corresponding scale 
model (DeLoache, 1989). This seems to be due to trouble dissociating properties of the 
scale model, which is a physical entity in its own right, from abstracted information about 
the other room. Manipulations which make the children believe that, instead of being a 
scale model, the small room has now been blown up to be the full scale room remove 
the difficulty (DeLoache, 1995). The lesson for educators from this is that understanding 
an object to be both itself and a symbol for a more abstract piece of information is not 
simple for children. This difficulty could have implications for adults as well, who clearly 
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have no trouble understanding scale models, but who may primarily focus on concrete 
aspects of an object, or automatically be drawn to perceptual features, drawing processing 
resources away from the more conceptual level (i.e., Sloutsky et al., 2005).
One potential reason for these difficulties may be because different materials afford 
the development of different representations. The internal representation of the problem 
is critical, as it determines which strategies a person will use to solve it (Kotovsky & Fallside, 
1989; Nokes, 2009; Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005). Kotovsky and Fallside (1989) showed how the 
exact same stimuli can produce different mental representations, which affect subsequent 
problem solving. They asked participants to perform certain problem-solving tasks (iso-
morphs of the classic “Tower of Hanoi” problem) while systematically varying either the 
perceptual stimuli they received or the instructions. For example, identical stimuli could 
either be interpreted as representing an object changing two-dimensional shape, or 
moving through space and changing 3-dimensional depth. They found that using similar 
mental representations at learning and transfer was the best predictor of performance, 
and that the critical variable was not really which stimuli were used, but what mental 
representation was formed. 
Concrete materials, then, may be most beneficial when they facilitate intuitive strate-
gies or make certain aspects of the concepts obvious, such as the case of using pie pieces 
when teaching fractions. Practice with these sorts of materials should lead to increased 
procedural fluency, as some of the harder abstract reasoning is unnecessary, and more 
informal strategies can usually be recruited. However, this focus on concrete knowing and 
procedural fluency may lead to poor development of abstract, conceptual knowledge 
without further cognitive processing such as engaging in reflection.
If we know that different materials may be creating different representations, an 
open question remains about how to make instruction more likely to create appropri-
ate representations that highlight the critical features of the problem. We know that it is 
not just what kinds of learning materials are used (i.e., concrete versus abstract) but how 
those materials are used that is critical. The types of activities students engage in when 
problem solving critically influences what is learned and where that knowledge can be 
transferred. In the current work we focus on how the type of directive question, whether 
it is metacognitive or problem-focused, impacts learning and problem solving. In the next 
section we briefly review the prior work on metacognitive prompting and the predictions 
of the current study.
Prior Work on Metacognition in Problem Solving
Metacognition is the active process of reflecting, explicitly, on one’s own cognitive activity 
(Brown, 1978; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Kluwe, 1982; Schoenfeld, 1987). While problem-
solving, this is manifested in monitoring one’s progress, evaluating that progress, and 
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regulating future activity (Zimmerman & Campillo, 2003; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). It is also 
a process which allows for the creation of new knowledge, as monitoring and evaluating 
can lead one to notice important deficits in knowledge, leading one to address that deficit 
by taking steps like consulting examples or self-explaining (Chi, 2000). 
Research has shown benefits for receiving metacognitive prompts while learning 
by problem solving (Berardi- Coletta, Buyer, Dominowski, & Rellinger, 1995; Chi, de Leeuw, 
Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Schoenfeld, 1987). Specifically, the act of reflecting on one’s 
problem-solving process within the domain (metacognitive prompts) is more important 
to developing conceptual understanding than focusing on the particular pieces of domain 
knowledge (problem-focused prompts) (Berardi-Coletta et al., 1995). This research suggests 
that pairing concrete materials with metacognitive prompts should facilitate procedural 
fluency as well as conceptual understanding and transfer. The concrete materials should 
support intuitive strategies, reduce cognitive load, and highlight important features of 
the problem for learning procedural skills. Prompting for metacognitive reflection of 
those skills should facilitate sense-making processes for determining how the highlighted 
features relate to one another, improving conceptual understanding, abstraction, and the 
development of flexible representations. 
Predictions
Given this existing literature on the effects of different learning materials (abstract versus 
concrete), as well as the separate studies showing a benefit for metacognitive prompts 
versus problem-focused, we predict the following: 1) Concrete materials paired with 
metacognitive prompts would result in the acquisition of adaptive expertise (i.e., acquir-
ing both procedural fluency and conceptual understanding); 2) Concrete materials would 
help participants develop procedural fluency, while abstract materials would help partici-
pants develop better understanding of the underlying concepts; 3) Concrete materials 
would be the most engaging for participants, and that engagement with the learning 
materials would result in improved learning. This last prediction was based in the view 
that concrete, visually salient materials would be more motivating to use for participants. 
More engagement with and better affect toward learning materials would lead to better 
learning outcomes (Cordova & Lepper, 1996). 
Methods
Participants
Ninety University of Pittsburgh students participated (mean age = 19.25, SD =2.14) in 
this experiment and received partial course credit. The majority of the participants (71) 
reported not having any prior knowledge of the target concepts (permutations and com-
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binations) as assessed by a background questionnaire. Nineteen participants reported 
having some prior experience with the probability concepts being covered. Because these 
participants were evenly distributed across the conditions, we did not exclude them from 
the subsequent analyses. 
Design and Materials
We used a 3 (manipulatives: concrete, abstract, none) X 2 (prompt-type: metacognitive, 
problem-focused) between-subjects design with participants randomly assigned to one of 
six learning conditions. Materials were presented in separate learning and test packets. The 
materials consisted of a demographic sheet, a questionnaire, a talk out-loud practice sheet, 
the learning materials, a second questionnaire, test problems, and a final questionnaire. 
Questionnaires
The demographic questionnaire consisted of three open-ended questions that assessed 
prior mathematics experience (e.g., “Please list all of your high school mathematics 
courses.”). There were also three questionnaires administered during the study including: 
a pre-learning questionnaire, an after-learning questionnaire, and an after-test question-
naire. The pre-learning questionnaire assessed participants’ attitudes toward math in 
general and general learning strategies (see Table 1, Part A for example questions). The 
post-learning questionnaire assessed participants’ subjective experiences while going 
through the learning packet, as well as their perceptions of the materials (see Table 1, part 
B). The post-test questionnaire also assessed participants’ subjective experiences, as well 
as attitudes about the experimental materials and their mathematical abilities (see Table 1, 
part C). These were all assessed on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” 
(1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). All questionnaire items are listed in the Appendix.
Table 1. Sample items from pre-learning, post-learning, and post-test question-
naires.
Learning materials
Problems. The target learning concepts were permutations and combinations with the 
order of presentation counterbalanced across conditions. The first page of the learning 
packet was a brief instruction on probability notation (i.e., “The probability of any given 
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number coming up on a six-sided die is 1/6”) and on factorial notation (i.e., “4! = 4 X 3 X 
2 X 1”). There were also simple, comprehension-check questions such as “What does 5! 
equal?” If participants displayed any difficulties with these, the experimenter would clarify 
the concepts. 
The next page presented a simple probability problem (either combinations or per-
mutations) without instructions about how to solve it (i.e., the “discovery problem,” see 
Table 2). Participants could solve the problem with a counting method (e.g., for permuta-
tions make one valid order, record it, make another valid order and record that, until all 
possibilities have been exhausted). The purpose of the problem was to see if participants 
knew the formula to calculate the solution, and if not, whether they could invent a way 
to solve it given the materials they had for that condition. 
The next problem students completed was the modeled problem, which also used 
small, computationally tractable values and could be completed by a counting method. 
The first few steps of a counting method were demonstrated for the participant (a more 
detailed description of this demonstration is provided in the procedure), and the partici-
pant then solved the problem by herself. 
The next page presented a worked example that walked participants through 
solving a problem vis-à-vis the formula (see Figure 2). Participants had to fill in blanks as 
they proceeded, which were designed in such a way as to focus attention on important 
conceptual features of the formula. The purpose of the worked example was to bridge 
the discovery and modeled problem learning experiences and intuitive strategies to the 
formal computational method for calculating the solution. The worked example was 
then followed by two practice problems that also provided the formula. These problems 
included higher values that were not easily calculated via the counting methods that 
were demonstrated earlier. 
The next page presented the second probability concept (permutations or combina-
tions depending on the condition), and replicated the order and types of materials for that 
concept. All problems in each section used the same general cover story (i.e., permutations 
problems dealt with puppies, combinations with CDs, see Table 2). Several problems were 
adapted from Ross & Kilbane (1997), and all problems instructed participants to find the 
probability of one scenario out of all the possibilities. 
Prompts. Two types of prompts were used during the experiment (see Table 3 for 
example prompts used in each condition). Metacognitive prompts were designed to 
focus attention on the conceptual relations between the objects and activities in the 
story problems and the variables and values in the formulas. They were designed to have 
participants reflect on the problem-solving processes involved in calculating permuta-
tions and combinations. In contrast, the problem-focused prompts were designed to focus 
attention on participants’ current goals and tasks.
These prompts were based on the prompts used in Berardi-Coletta et al. (1995). The 
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Table 2. Example discovery, modeled, and practice problems for each concept, along 
with task demands for the participant (some problems adapted from Ross & Kilbane, 
1997). 
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Figure 2. The worked example which introduced the combinations formula, adapted 
from Ross & Kilbane (1997).
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experimenter gave a different prompt every 45 seconds while participants were work-
ing on the discovery, modeled, and practice problems. No prompts were given during 
the worked example, nor during the test phase. The reflection prompt was given after 
each problem had been solved, or time had run out for that particular problem (see third 
column of Table 3). 
Manipulatives. All problems in the learning packet had cover stories dealing with either 
puppies or CDs. Participants in the concrete manipulatives condition received manipula-
tives that matched the contexts of the problem (see Figure 3). That is, problems about 
puppies were matched with small toy puppies, and problems about CDs were matched 
with CD cases. Participants in the abstract manipulative condition received the same num-
ber of colored blocks. These are considered abstract in that they share no direct relation 
to the contexts of the problem. Moreover, those in the abstract manipulative condition 
Table 3. Example metacognitive and problem-focused prompts (adapted from Berardi-
Coletta et al., 1995). Different initial and variable prompts were given every 45 sec-
onds. Variable prompts refer to specific variables in a given formula (i.e., “h” and “r” are 
variables which represent the number of options available). Reflection prompts were 
given after participants had looked over the solution for 30 seconds.
Figure 3. Examples of abstract and concrete manipulatives.
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used the same objects in both contexts. However, this manipulation is still more concrete 
than receiving no manipulatives; this condition requires participants to generate and use 
some kind of symbolic notation to solve the problem. 
Test materials
The test consisted of 12 word problems, two “write-your-own” problems, where participants 
were presented the formula and asked to write a word problem that could be solved us-
ing that formula, and eight conceptual questions, which asked participants about various 
features of the formula and their underlying conceptual understanding. 
Packets were counterbalanced so that half the participants received a combinations 
problem first and the other half received a permutations problem. This first problem had 
the same cover story as in the learning phase, though the problem itself was new (i.e., 
permutations problem dealt with puppies, combinations with CDs, but with new values). 
The participants were not given the formulas during this problem. This problem assessed 
how sensitive participants were to the learning context. If what they learned was tied to 
the particular story context they should be more likely to access that knowledge on a 
problem using the same story context.
The next three problems were also presented without the formula, but these were 
presented in new cover story contexts (airplanes in a hangar, knights at a joust, and cars 
at a factory). These problems always dealt with the concept which did not apply to the 
first problem (i.e., if the first problem was a permutations problem, the next three were 
combinations problems). These problems assessed transfer to a new context. In addition, 
participants were given access to new manipulatives during these problems. Each story 
problem could be matched with either a concrete manipulative that matched the story 
context (e.g., airplanes), an abstract manipulative which did not (i.e., colored tiles), or no 
manipulatives. This was done to see if participants who had used manipulatives had learned 
particular strategies that were more accessible when they had access to manipulatives. 
The next 8 word problems were multiple choice problems (4 permutations and 4 
combinations). Each problem presented both formulas, and the participants’ task was to 
first choose the correct formula and then calculate the solution. These problems separated 
concept access (determining which formula applies) from procedural application (choosing 
what values to map onto the variables). Even if the participant had chosen the conceptu-
ally wrong formula, which would not give them the correct answer for the problem, they 
could still extract meaningful values from the problem and use it to come to a solution. 
This will be discussed in detail in the results section. 
Procedure
Participants were run individually in 90-minute sessions. The experimenter was present 
throughout, administering all of the materials and delivering all of the prompts. Participants 
worked through, in order, a demographics sheet, a questionnaire, talk out-loud practice (to 
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get them used to talking aloud as they worked), the learning materials, another question-
naire, the test materials, and a final questionnaire. 
The three questionnaires took approximately two minutes each to complete. After 
filling out the demographics sheet and the pre-learning questionnaire, participants were 
given instructions and practice for talking aloud during the learning. The learning session 
was audio- and video-recorded. Each of the two concepts in the learning packet took ap-
proximately 20 minutes to complete. 
Participants were given four and a half minutes to solve the first (discovery) prob-
lem. After they generated a solution or time elapsed they were presented the second 
(modeled) problem. For this problem, the experimenter first had the participant read the 
problem aloud and then modeled a procedure for calculating the solution (i.e., a simple 
counting method), using the manipulatives. The experimenter arranged the manipulatives, 
illustrated two possible arrangements, and then told the participant to continue counting 
all possibilities in the same way. Participants in the no-manipulatives condition were also 
shown a counting method, but the method was introduced via a paper-based worked 
example representing the objects on the page instead of with manipulatives, and with no 
experimenter input. The instructions on the page mirrored what the experimenter told 
participants in the manipulative conditions. Participants had four minutes to solve this 
problem. Participants were then given four and half minutes to read and complete the 
worked example, after which they were given 30 seconds to look over the solution. 
Participants were then given two and half minutes for the first practice problem (with 
30 seconds to look over the solution), and another two and half minutes for the second 
practice problem (with 30 seconds to look over the solution). For all of these problems, 
the participants would circle the word “Finished” at the bottom of the page when they 
were done. After participants marked finished, the experimenter waited 30 seconds before 
allowing them to move on. During this time participants were encouraged to go back, 
check their work, and change their solution if they wished. Participants were prompted 
every 45 seconds as they worked on all of these problems, except for the worked example, 
which they completed on their own. Responses to the prompts, as well as the talk-aloud 
protocols of their problem solving, were captured by an audio recording.
The test phase took approximately 40 minutes total, with participants having up 
to two and a half minutes for each of the word problems, three minutes for each of the 
“write-your-own” problems, and five minutes for the short answer conceptual questions. 
Participants did not talk aloud during the test phase. 
Results
The results are divided into two main sections of test performance and engagement. First, 
we examine how the learning materials and prompts impact participants’ test perfor-
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mance by examining conceptual and procedural accuracy. Then, we examine participants’ 
self-reported engagement with the learning materials and its effect on subsequent test 
performance.
Test Performance
Recall that our predictions were that concrete manipulatives would lead to better proce-
dural skill in choosing variables, which will be referred to in this section as “Procedural Use,” 
while abstract manipulatives would benefit the ability to choose the applicable concept, 
which will be referred to as “Concept Access.” We also predicted an interaction between 
these factors, such that the best overall learning would result from the combination of 
concrete manipulatives and metacognitive prompts. 
A successful solution to the test problems required participants to choose the ap-
propriate formula (permutations or combinations), extract the relevant numbers for each 
of the variables (all of the problems had distracter information), and instantiate those 
variables correctly in the formula. A unique property of these concepts is that one can 
assign the correct numbers even when dealing with the wrong formula (i.e., knowing 
that the larger number is the one being chosen or selected from). Participants’ extrac-
tion of relevant variables from the problem was not contingent upon them choosing the 
conceptually relevant formula. Because of this dissociation, we could differentiate more 
conceptual-level knowledge (which concept and corresponding formula applies) from 
procedural skill (how to assign variables from text to the appropriate variables). 
Reported here is the performance on the first 12 items. There were no differences in 
performance on the first 4 problems, which had participants generate the formula, and 
the last 8, which asked participants to choose the correct formula, F (2, 84) < 1, ns, so all 12 
items are combined and reported together. All of these problems required participants 
to determine the applicable formula, find the correct variables from the problem state-
ment, and then compute the solution. First, we describe overall accuracy in solving the 
problems (correct formula, variable instantiation, and computation). Then, we split our 
accuracy scores into the sub-skills of “Concept Access,” i.e., choosing the correct formula, 
and “Procedural Use”, i.e., instantiating variables. All analyses are reported in terms of 
proportion correct.
Accuracy. Accuracy assessed participants’ ability to solve each problem completely 
and correctly (i.e., correct formula, variable instantiation, and computation). This was 
coded as 0 for incorrect answers and 1 for correct answers. Because some participants had 
trouble with the calculations involved with the formulas, this measure provides different 
information than simply combining the “Concept Access” and “Procedural Use” measures. 
Group means were generally low; only about 4.5 problems out 12 were solved correctly, 
on average (see Figure 4). 
We conducted a 3 (manipulatives: abstract, concrete, none) X 2 (prompt type: meta-
cognitive, problem focused) between-subjects ANOVA to investigate the effect of manipu-
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Figure 4. Mean proportion (+/- one standard error) of problems correctly solved for 
each training group, or overall accuracy. 
Figure 5. Mean proportion (+/- one standard error) for correctly selecting the correct 
principle for each training group, or “Concept Access.” The dashed line represents 
performance at chance.
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latives and prompt type on overall accuracy. Analysis revealed no effect of manipulative, F 
(2, 84) = .07, ns, prompt type, F (1,84) = .09, ns, or an interaction, F (2, 84) = .12, ns. This shows 
no overall performance differences on problem solving when collapsing across sub-skills. 
Next we look at whether groups differed on the sub-skill of concept access.
Concept Access. Concept access assessed participants’ ability to correctly choose which 
formula applies on a given problem. Participants were given a score of 0 if they chose the 
incorrect formula, and given a score of 1 if they chose the correct formula. Figure 5 shows 
means and standard errors for this measure.
We conducted a 3 (manipulatives: abstract, concrete, none) X 2 (prompt type: meta-
cognitive, problem focused) between-subjects ANOVA to investigate the effect of manipu-
latives and prompt type on concept access. Analysis revealed no effect of manipulative, 
F(2, 84) = 1.42, ns, prompt type, F(1, 84) < 1, ns, or an interaction, F(2, 84) < 1, ns. It appears 
that our experimental manipulations did not differentially influence participants’ abil-
ity to decide which formula applied. However, some learning did occur, as every group 
performed better than chance, all t’s (14) > 1.75, p ≤ .05 (see Figure 5). This result suggests 
that all conditions were somewhat successful in facilitating learning of the concepts and 
the ability to transfer and access those concepts in novel scenarios (all test problems but 
one had new problem scenarios). 
Procedural Use. Procedural use measured participants’ ability to correctly assign the 
relevant values from the word problems to the appropriate variables in the equation. 
Correct instantiation of the variables could be completed regardless of whether the right 
concept was selected because there were two variables for any given equation—the 
number of items being chosen from and the number of items being chosen. Each word 
problem also included distracter information, so this process involved more than simply 
finding numbers in the problem and plugging them into the formula (randomly plugging 
numbers from the word problem into each variable would result in only a 7% chance, 
on average, of getting both variables correct). Participants were given scores of 0, 1, or 2, 
based on whether they correctly assigned 0, 1 or 2 of the variables. Figure 6 shows means 
and standard errors of each group on this measure.
A 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with procedural use as the dependant variable. Analysis 
revealed no effect for manipulatives, F (2, 84) <1, ns, prompt type, F (1, 84) =1.59, ns, or an 
interaction, F (2, 84) = 1.23, ns. However, planned comparisons for the effect of prompts on 
the students using concrete manipulatives revealed a significant difference between the 
problem-focused versus metacognitive prompt conditions. That is, among all participants 
who received concrete materials, those who received metacognitive prompts had a higher 
percentage of variables correct than those who received problem-focused prompts, t(28) 
= 2.44, p < .05, d = .93. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the concrete 
materials would facilitate procedural fluency and the reflective prompts would facilitate 
Examining the Role of Manipulatives and Metacognition  119
• volume 2, no. 2 (Fall 2009)
Figure 6. Mean proportion (+/- one standard error) of variables correctly instantiated 
for each training group, or “Procedural Use.”
Figure 7. The interaction between prompt type and engrossment level on test per-
formance. Error bars represent +/- one standard error. 
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the abstraction of those skills so they could transfer to new contexts (conceptual learning 
advantages are discussed in the next section). 
Conceptual Problems. For the conceptual, open-response questions, a solution rubric 
was used to classify the solutions as either correct and incorrect. These problems asked 
participants to explain features and applications of the formulas they had learned, such as 
what the variables stand for, and to compare and contrast the permutations and combina-
tions formulas. Results for the conceptual questions reported here are in terms of correct 
or incorrect on four problems (see Table 4); the other four problems were at ceiling for all 
conditions. These four ceiling problems asked participants to describe what variables in 
the formula stood for (i.e., “What is n?” “What is r?” “What is j?” “What does (j-h) mean?”). 
Most participants could answer these in simple terms, such as “r is the number of items 
being chosen.” 
Table 4. Each value reflects % of the group who was coded as having a correct answer, 
with standard error in parenthesis, for the Concrete Manipulative (CM), Abstract Ma-
nipulative (AM) and No Manipulative (NM) groups, within each prompt type. 
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To test the effect of the pairing of concrete manipulatives with metacognitive prompts, 
we computed a total correct and incorrect sum across the four conceptual problems, and 
submitted these to Chi-Square analyses. We compared performance of the groups who 
received concrete manipulatives to the other two manipulative types. Within the meta-
cognitive group, the concrete manipulatives group had a higher percentage of correct 
responses (63.3%) than the abstract and no manipulative groups combined (45.8%), X2 
(1, N = 180) = 4.91, p < .05. Within the problem-focused group, there was no difference 
between concrete (56.6%) and other types of manipulatives (49.2%), X2 (1, N = 180) = .91, 
ns. Similar comparisons of abstract and no manipulatives against the performance of the 
other two groups were not significant, all X2’s (1, N = 180)  < 2.50, ns. It appears that the 
pairing of concrete manipulatives with metacognitive prompts produced better concep-
tual knowledge than other combinations of materials and prompts. 
Engagement
We hypothesized that concrete materials would be the most engaging for participants, 
and that engagement would lead to deeper processing. To assess engagement, we asked 
participants to complete a questionnaire immediately after the learning phase. The two 
most direct measures of engagement and interest asked participants how much they 
agreed to statements “I was engrossed in the materials as I went through the packet” and 
“I thought the materials were interesting” on a 5-point Likert scale. Different materials did 
not produce any differences in response to these questions, as demonstrated in a one-way 
ANOVA, F’s (2, 85) < .90, ns. Engagement in this population was not easily manipulated 
through the use of different materials.  It is possible that these materials were not attrac-
tive to the age group in our study, even as useful aids in their learning. Similarly, the type 
of prompts did not lead to different responses on these items, t’s(86) < .78, ns. 
Engagement/Prompt Interaction. Further analysis into the effect of engagement on 
subsequent test performance revealed an interaction within experimental conditions on 
our measure of accuracy, or the ability to solve each problem correctly. Among those people 
who reported feeling engrossed in the materials, an interaction emerged with the type 
of prompt, such that the effect of being engrossed or not was different for each prompt 
type. Specifically, among those participants who reported feeling engrossed (4 or 5 on 
the scale), problem-focused prompts resulted in more correct answers. Conversely, when 
participants reported not being engrossed (1 or 2 on the scale) metacognitive prompts 
led to better test results.  This interaction was significant, F (1, 63) = 5.04, p < .05, d = .57 
(see Figure 7). 
No such interaction was observed for different types of manipulatives in a 5 X 3 
ANOVA, F(8, 73) < 1, ns, nor for a 3-way interaction between prompts, manipulatives, and 
engrossment level, F(6, 61) < 1, ns. Among those participants who subjectively reported 
feeling engrossed in the learning materials, those who were prompted to focus on the 
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particulars of the problem performed better (M = .48, SD = .22) on the test than those who 
received more abstraction-based metacognitive prompts (M = .33, SD = .23), t(31) = 2.7, p 
<.05 . Conversely, among those participants who did not have the affective experience of 
being engrossed in the learning materials, the metacognitive prompts (M = .38, SD = .31) 
tended to improve subsequent test performance compared to problem-focused prompts 
(M = .25, SD = .25), although this difference was not significant, t(25) = 1.22, ns. We will 
discuss potential reasons for these differences in the following section. 
Discussion
Our manipulations did not produce any differences in participants’ overall problem accu-
racy. We also did not see any differences in participants’ ability to correctly choose which 
formula applied in a given problem. However, all groups showed strong evidence of learn-
ing, performing better than chance in choosing which formula applies as well as answering 
about 40 percent of the computationally complex problems correctly. Participants also 
developed the skill to correctly instantiate variables based on the word problems, even 
amongst distracter information. All groups demonstrated above chance ability on this 
measure. Critically, we observed a benefit for concrete materials paired with metacogni-
tive prompts over problem-focused prompts. 
We had predicted that concrete materials paired with metacognitive prompts would 
lead to the most robust learning, that abstract materials would aid in conceptual under-
standing, and that concrete materials would aid in the development of procedural skill. Our 
results did not support the last two predictions, but we did see evidence for the benefit 
of concrete materials paired with metacognitive prompts. In contrast to our predictions, 
participants who learned with abstract materials trended toward having the lowest levels 
of concept access on the subsequent test, suggesting that they actually took attention 
away from developing conceptual knowledge necessary to choose which formula applies 
in a given situation. It is possible that the materials were too abstract for participants to see 
their utility in facilitating understanding and problem-solving in our experiment. Similarly, 
concrete learning materials on their own did not facilitate procedural use, or correct vari-
able instantiation, on the test. It is possible that these materials were not seen as a useful 
model of the real-world applications of the concepts, and so the variable assignment 
aspects of the formula were insufficiently grounded in their everyday reasoning. 
However, we did see that concrete materials paired with metacognitive prompts 
during learning led to better procedural use, the subskill of finding the correct variables 
in a given problem. This may be because grounding new learning in concrete examples 
results in a reduced cognitive load (Sweller, 2006), relative to instruction without such 
resources. This reduction in cognitive load may allow deeper, more effortful reflection to 
occur in response to metacognitive prompts, leading to improved ability to reason about 
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the problem (Sweller, 1988). Additional evidence for this possibility comes from the higher 
scores on the conceptual test items for those students who received concrete manipula-
tives and metacognitive prompts. Another possible account for the benefit of concrete 
learning materials with metacognitive prompts has to do with the representations formed 
by this pairing. As noted earlier, the cognitive representation acquired will have a critical 
role in how knowledge is used in problem solving (Kotovsky & Fallside, 1989). This pair-
ing may be particularly well-suited to creating a flexible representation, which is based 
in concrete, real-world knowledge but, after reflection, abstract enough to apply in many 
situations and to give insight into the concepts underlying the formulas. 
These results provide evidence that materials by themselves do not necessarily im-
prove the ability of students to reason deeply about the topic. This work adds to a growing 
body of research that points to weaknesses in the pedagogical assumption that making 
materials as concrete and real-world as possible will automatically increase student learn-
ing. Research on text-based interest (Harp & Mayer, 1998), perceptual richness (Sloutsky, 
Kaminski, & Heckler, 2005; McNeil, Uttal, Jarvin, & Sternberg, 2009) and narrative voice (Son 
& Goldstone, 2009b) have all pointed to the limitations of such a view. In many of these 
cases, manipulations are made to instructional materials and the effect on student learn-
ing is observed. The current study has illustrated the benefit of examining manipulations 
to both instructional materials and student processing, such as responding to prompted 
questions. However, work clearly remains to be done to map out all of the ways in which 
materials and student cognition interact, and how this varies across populations. Some of 
this research is done with young children (i.e., DeLoache, 1989) while some is done with 
adults (i.e., Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003), so results need to be considered in a develop-
mental framework. 
Perhaps our most surprising findings dealt with the role of engagement with learning 
materials on subsequent test performance. While we had predicted that concrete materials 
would be the most engaging for participants, we instead found no relationship between 
type of materials used and how engrossed participants reported feeling. This was most 
likely due to the population used, college students, who did not seem to consider the 
manipulatives useful tools for their understanding, even though relying solely on their in-
ternal representations did not lead to optimal performance. The types of prompts students 
received did not lead to differences on the questionnaire items dealing with engagement. 
We did find, however, an interaction between level of engagement and type of prompt, such 
that those who felt engrossed benefited from receiving simpler, more problem-focused 
prompts. Those who did not feel engrossed showed no difference across prompts, but a 
trend of a benefit from receiving more reflective, difficult metacognitive prompts. 
This suggests the possibility that the subjective feeling of engrossment occurs when 
students are deeply processing the material, such that further attempts to have them 
reflect are distracting and harmful for learning. In such a case, simple prompts that keep 
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them focused on the particulars of the problem may be the best learning tool. However, if 
a student is not feeling engaged in the materials, asking harder, more reflective questions 
may facilitate deeper processing of a problem which they may otherwise have not en-
gaged. This view is consistent with research on text processing, which has found that more 
engaging materials direct attention to more abstract, comprehension-related cognitive 
processes, while less engaging materials keep attention focused on more perceptual-level 
details, such as features of the font and spelling (McDaniel, Waddill, Finstad, & Bourg, 2000). 
There is also evidence that students interested in developing a deep understanding of a 
topic or who already have some domain knowledge are harmed by interventions aimed 
to make the materials more attractive (Durik & Harackiewicz, 2007), while those who are 
not interested do benefit from such interventions (Durik & Harackiewicz, 2007; Son & 
Goldstone, 2009b) and from more exploratory, open-ended and self-guided instructional 
methods (Belenky & Nokes, 2009). 
The educational implications of these findings are for instructors to focus on monitor-
ing how absorbed students are in the materials and then tailoring instruction to match 
the motivational / affective state. Based on these and related findings, it would seem that 
if a student is already engaging, it is best to stay out of her way, and not interrupt her self-
guided activity to focus on a conceptual-level question. With the development of intel-
ligent tutoring systems with built-in detectors of affect based on student behaviors (i.e., 
Baker, Rodrigo, & Xolocotzin, 2008), this possibility will be open to empirical investigation. 
This work also demonstrates a need for educators to consider not only the ways in which 
materials are presented, but also the myriad ways in which students can engage with them. 
An overreliance on monitoring behavioral activity (such as using physical materials) could 
lead educators to pay less attention to the cognitive activity students are undertaking. 
Such a view could lead to educational practices that seem successful at first glance, but 
ultimately result in poorer learning (Mayer, 2004). 
Future work in dealing with the effect of affect and subjective experience on learning 
is needed. Assumptions such as “if a person is motivated, they will learn better” are insuf-
ficient, at best, and incorrect, at worst. Research examining different types of processing 
triggered by various levels of engagement and affective response will provide a crucial 
next step in better understanding the role of subjective experience on learning. 
Appendix
Initial Questionnaire
When I am learning about something new, I try to make sure I understand it.
When I learn something new, I try to relate the material to what I already know.
I am interested in learning about probability. 
I am interested in learning about math.
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I think I would do better in math classes if they did not have as many calculations.
In math classes, I understand the concepts well but have problems with their problem 
solving.
When I have a chance to learn something new, I usually take it.
When I am studying, I ask myself questions to make sure I understand the material. 
Activity Questionnaire
The explanations in the examples were easy to follow.
The information in the worked examples was well organized.
The information in the practice problems was well organized.
The problem scenarios were easy to imagine.
The materials helped me to organize the information.
I was engrossed in the materials while going through the packet.
How do you feel about your ability to solve the problems that were presented? (1-3 
scale)
Post-Test Questionnaire
I thought the materials were interesting. 
I got caught up in the materials without trying to. 
I think others would find these materials interesting. 
I would like to learn more about probability in the future. 
I found it easy to pay attention to the materials.  
I found it easy to understand the materials. 
I have used materials like these before. 
During the experiment, I thought I was improving, even if I was making mistakes. 
How do you feel about your ability to solve the problems that were presented? (1-3 
scale)
*Unless noted, all questions were assessed on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” 
(1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). 
Endnote
1. It is important to note that the terms abstract and concrete always describe a relation to 
a “norm” or another “situation / object / feature” in the world. When we use the terms “ab-
stract” or “concrete” we are saying more “abstractly related” or more “concretely related” 
to the particular learning scenario. We view this as a continuous dimension that is relative 
to some comparison scenario. Abstraction also has another meaning that we do not address 
in the current work that refers to the class of objects the concept points to, e.g., the concept 
of mammal is more abstract than the concept of dog. 
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